The Politics Of What Appears Natural
A substantial portion of judgments concerning gender are not presented as explicit ideological claims; rather, through their ordinariness and repetitiveness, they circulate as “self-evident truths” that are internalized without question. These naturalized assumptions thereby become one of the most effective mechanisms through which the social order is legitimized (Ridgeway, 2011; Sakallı Uğurlu, 2016). Within this context, widely held beliefs such as women being more emotional and men more rational function less as ideological propositions than as forms of cultural background knowledge, quietly shaping everyday interactions as well as institutional domains (Connell, 2005; Fiske, 2018).
What is critical here is not the empirical accuracy of these judgments, but rather why they appear so familiar and resistant to scrutiny. This very familiarity reveals a form of power that operates without overt coercion—one that weakens resistance through invisibility and sustains itself by appearing natural.
From this perspective, gender stereotypes should be understood not as innocuous generalizations but as cognitive and cultural apparatuses that constrain psychological experience within predefined forms and normalize inequality (Ridgeway, 2011; Sakallı Uğurlu, 2018).
Cognitive Schemas, Social Comfort, And Psychological Costs
Within the social psychological literature, stereotypes are defined as cognitive schemas that facilitate individuals’ ability to cope with uncertainty in the social world. Yet while these schemas provide collective-level comfort by simplifying social perception, they often generate significant psychological costs at the individual level. This is because such schemas structure not only expectations about others but also individuals’ self-perceptions and self-evaluations (Fiske, 2018).
For instance, the association of women with emotionality and men with rationality produces an implicit neurocognitive and normative hierarchy that regulates not merely the existence of emotions, but which emotions may be expressed, by whom, in which contexts, and with what cognitive legitimacy. This hierarchy rests upon a historically entrenched yet scientifically problematic dualism that separates emotional processes from cognitive functions (Damasio, 1994; Pessoa, 2008). As a result, emotions are coded as irrational, disruptive, or weakening of cognitive control, while emotional expression—particularly when attributed to women—gains legitimacy as a supposed neuropsychological fact presumed to conflict with decision-making capacity, executive functioning, and cognitive competence (Gross, 2015; Fine, 2017).
Contrary to these assumptions, contemporary neuroscience and cognitive psychology demonstrate that emotional and cognitive processes operate through largely overlapping neural networks. Interactions between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system are central to decision-making, attentional regulation, and social reasoning (Pessoa, 2008; Lerner et al., 2015). Despite this integrative evidence, emotional expression continues to be selectively interpreted through a gendered lens: as a stable cognitive trait in women and as a contextual, temporary state in men.
The central issue, therefore, is not whether women are in fact more emotional, but why emotionality continues to be coded as a characteristic that undermines cognitive competence—and how this coding is automated through cognitive shortcuts such as representativeness and confirmation biases (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Through these mechanisms, gender stereotypes generate expectation patterns at the neural level, leading to heightened surveillance of women’s cognitive performance, generalization of their errors, and the persistent, implicit questioning of their competence. Via stereotype threat, this process creates a psychological pressure that affects not only perception but cognitive performance itself (Steele, 1997; Schmader et al., 2008). Emotions thus cease to function as a universal human cognitive resource and are instead positioned as a gendered neuropsychological risk factor.
Subtle Forms Of Sexism: Protection Or Constraint?
Sexism is conceptualized as a multi-layered set of attitudes and practices that define individuals according to biologically grounded gender categories, assign them specific traits, roles, and expectations, and legitimize these assignments through social hierarchies and normative regulations (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Ridgeway, 2011). While traditional approaches have primarily associated sexism with overt discrimination, exclusion, or devaluation, contemporary research demonstrates that sexism can simultaneously manifest in both hostile and benevolent forms (Glick & Fiske, 1996).
The ambivalent sexism model illustrates this dual mechanism by showing how women may be portrayed as incompetent, irrational, or threatening on the one hand, while being idealized as “delicate,” “morally superior,” and “in need of protection” on the other. These benevolent narratives offer an effective means of sustaining inequality without openly endorsing it. Research conducted in the Turkish context by Nuray Sakallı further demonstrates that such discourses become particularly resistant to critique when they align with cultural values and family ideologies (Sakallı Uğurlu, 2002). Positioning women as “those who must be protected” thus functions as a powerful strategy for limiting equality without explicitly rejecting it.
The core contradiction remains evident: To what extent can equality be possible for a subject whose autonomy is systematically constrained?
Roles, Institutions, And The Silent Demand For Compliance
Gender roles—understood as the set of expectations associated with femininity and masculinity—are reproduced not only through individual attitudes but also institutionally, via family structures, labour markets, educational systems, and legal frameworks. The assumption that these roles are “natural” constitutes one of the most effective mechanisms legitimizing sexism and inequality (Connell, 2005). As Sakallı Uğurlu (2016) emphasizes, particularly in contexts where patriarchal norms are strong, sexism is preserved through discourses of cultural continuity and social order. This leads individuals to interpret the constraints they experience not as structural inequalities but as personal requirements for adaptation.
At the institutional level, these normalized roles often reproduce inequality without relying on overtly discriminatory language. Instead, they reconstitute sexism through narratives of protection, order, and harmony, giving rise to its most refined—and therefore most resilient—forms.
This raises an unavoidable question: Where does the boundary between adaptation and relinquishment begin? And how are these boundaries internalized through tradition and culture?
An Anthropological Detour: Alternative Gender Regimes
Anthropological scholarship demonstrates that different societies construct gender concepts in markedly diverse ways through rituals, language, economic structures, and social practices, and that these concepts are not fixed but continuously negotiated through cultural dynamics (Davies, 2016; Mead, 1935). For example, the five-gender system identified in the Bugis society of Indonesia reveals that femininity and masculinity are not experienced as singular, stable categories but as contextual and relational positions (Graham Davies, 2010).
This perspective challenges the assumption that social roles can be directly derived from biological sex. Instead, it highlights how roles acquire meaning differently across cultures through texts, practices, and rituals, and how they are historically reproduced. Consequently, what is taken to be “natural” in terms of gender norms is shown to be culturally variable.
If alternative arrangements have been possible in other societies, on what grounds is the inevitability of current norms justified?
Instead Of A Conclusion: At The Edges Of The Silent Regime
Gender stereotypes, precisely because of their familiarity and ordinariness, continue to operate as a silent yet highly effective regime that confines psychological experience within predefined boundaries and reproduces inequality. This regime does not demand explicit obedience; rather, it functions by framing conformity as virtue and deviation as a costly transgression. As demonstrated by Sakallı’s work and the broader contemporary psychological and sociological literature, sexism persists not only in moments of overt discrimination but also within everyday practices that are deemed normal, natural, or even well-intentioned. Faced with this reality, individuals often find themselves compelled to adapt to the system rather than confront it.
The central question, then, is not how much these roles belong to us, but why exiting them continues to require such high psychological, social, and emotional costs. Gender inequality proves most enduring not when it is forcibly imposed, but when it becomes unquestionable. For this reason, thinking critically about gender entails not only identifying inequality, but also recognizing the silent compromises, internalized boundaries, and acts of relinquishment through which it is sustained.
References
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