We tend to assume that we know what we want in life. We rarely question which kind of life suits us or what counts as success and happiness. We perceive our desires as personal preferences and accept them as natural extensions of our inner world. Yet, despite seeing ourselves as unique and distinct individuals, we find that we all pursue similar dreams, similar goals, and almost standardized ways of living. This similarity is so systematic that explaining it solely through coincidence or general tendencies of human nature is insufficient.
As social media has become central to our lives, this similarity has become even more visible. In today’s media environment, we repeatedly encounter the same images. We constantly observe what others desire, what makes them happy, and what they define as success. We are regularly exposed to others’ preferences, lifestyles, and ideas, and this exposure makes desire not only internal but also socially learned. Despite living in different conditions and shaping our lives in different ways, our orientation toward similar goals and dreams suggests that desire may not be as personal as we assume, but rather something that often takes shape on a shared ground.
Mimetic Desire
We often do not remember how we began to want something; desire feels like it has always been there. Yet sometimes, simply seeing someone else desire something is enough. According to René Girard, people often begin to desire something not because of its intrinsic qualities, but because others desire it. When something is desired by someone perceived as higher in status, that alone can make it worth wanting. Their attention gives the object value, allowing desire to spread. In this sense, desire often emerges through an unconscious process of imitation.
The Social Proof Effect
Desire is influenced by the orientation of the majority as well as by specific individuals. In social psychology, this tendency refers to looking at others’ choices in order to determine what is acceptable or valuable. The fact that something is preferred by many people may create a basis for us to desire it. Therefore, desire gains strength through both imitation and prevalence.
Social Comparison Theory
Interacting with others inevitably brings comparison. Observing others’ lives often leads individuals to question their own position. People evaluate themselves by looking at others. However, this perspective often produces a sense of deficiency rather than inspiration. Desire ceases to be a source of excitement and instead turns into an effort to avoid falling behind or appearing inadequate.
Social Identity Theory
What we come to desire is not solely the result of individual comparisons. The people we spend time with and the groups we feel we belong to significantly influence what we desire. Individuals shape their values and goals through the groups they belong to, and what is considered desirable is defined by the norms and expectations of these groups. In this way, certain desires function as a natural part of belonging, without being consciously questioned.
The Dramaturgical Approach
In the media age, desires are not only experienced but also performed. The issue is often not what we have, but how we appear. From this perspective, the self is constructed on a social stage, where individuals present themselves to others. People desire not the object itself, but the image associated with it. Desires become tools for maintaining our role on this stage. Therefore, desire is related not only to what we pursue but also to how we are perceived.
The Structure Of Desire
According to Jacques Lacan, desire can never be fully satisfied. Humans do not only want what they lack; they continuously reproduce a sense of absence. For this reason, desire does not end when a particular object is attained; rather, if persists by taking on new forms. Within this framework, the “desire of the Other” is always present. Therefore, desire becomes a process rooted in an internal sense of lack while also shaped by social influences.
Self-Discrepancy Theory
At this point, individuals unconsciously create a distance within themselves. The gap between who they are (the actual self) and who they believe they should be (the ideal self) becomes more evident, and the resulting tension fuels desire. However, this ideal self is often not the result of internal discovery but of socially circulated models. Today, social media constantly updates these ideals and presents them as goals to be attained. Algorithms repeatedly present similar desires to us, and even if they are not truly ours, they begin to feel personal.
Conclusion
We see that it is not possible to completely eliminate desire or to make it entirely “authentic”. As inherently social beings, humans are influenced by others’ desires while also continuously generating new desires within themselves. Therefore, the solution is not to suppress desire or to completely isolate it from external influences but to become aware of its sources.
Questioning what we want and why we want it allows us to recognize desires that are not truly our own. Even if this awareness does not completely change the direction of desire, it reduces its influence over us. In this way, we can free ourselves from these learned patterns and redirect our focus from what we think we want to what we truly want.
References
Girard, R. (1965). Deceit, desire, and the novel: Self and other in literary structure. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Cialdini, R. B. (2009). Influence: Science and practice (5th ed.). Pearson.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7(2), 117–140. https://doi.org/10.1177/001872675400700202
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole.
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Anchor Books.
Lacan, J. (1977). Écrits: A selection (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Norton.
Higgins, E. T. (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94(3), 319–340. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.319