Human beings have a tendency to name and classify objects in order to make sense of the world. This tendency is considered a fundamental component of cognitive processes involved in conceptual organization and the formation of mental representations (Humphreys & Forde, 2001; Rosch, 1978). Classification and conceptualization enable individuals to reduce environmental uncertainty and construct mental representations of reality. While this process provides cognitive economy at the individual level, it also lays the groundwork for shared systems of meaning and the formation of group identities at the societal level (Lakoff, 1987).
In this context, people form communities through shared characteristics, values, and symbols, thereby developing a sense of we-ness. According to social identity theory, a significant portion of an individual’s self-concept is shaped through group memberships (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). While belonging to a group supports feelings of affiliation and self-esteem, a natural consequence of this process is the emergence of distinctions between the in-group and the out-group; over time, these distinctions may transform into practices of prejudice and othering (Turner et al., 1987).
From an evolutionary perspective, it has been suggested that wary attitudes toward out-groups may have served adaptive functions in certain contexts. Particularly in early human communities, caution toward unfamiliar groups increased the likelihood of survival by protecting resources and reducing physical threats (Buss, 2019; Kurzban et al., 2001). In contemporary societies, however, it becomes crucial to examine the psychological processes underlying stigmatization, labeling, and othering behaviors beyond their once survival-oriented functions.
Labeling entails positioning an “other” in opposition to the group with which one identifies; at a deeper level, does this process serve to reinforce the defense mechanism of splitting as conceptualized by Melanie Klein (Klein, 1946)? Does it allow self and object representations to be sharply divided into “good” and “bad,” thereby leading to an excessively black-and-white perception of the world? At the societal level, does this dynamic manifest as the idealization or complete devaluation of groups (Volkan, 1997)? Ultimately, can such defensive configurations create a psychological infrastructure that facilitates racism?
According to Klein, human beings are born with intense instinctual experiences, a significant portion of which consist of aggression and destructiveness (Klein, 1957). From very early in life, the infant possesses primitive and destructive affects such as envy. At the same time, Klein emphasizes that human beings are not composed solely of destructive drives; they also simultaneously contain capacities for love, reparation, and preservation. These two opposing drive constellations—life drives and destructive drives—create a constant tension within the self.
The infant experiences objects by projecting these internal affective states onto the external world. When positive affects predominate, the object is perceived as “good,” whereas when aggression and envy intensify, the same object may be experienced as “bad” and threatening. According to Klein, this perception can develop independently of the object’s actual attitudes and behaviors; what is decisive is the infant’s internal world (Klein, 1946).
Such a mode of perceptual organization constitutes one of the core features of the paranoid-schizoid position described by Klein. In this position, the self copes with intense anxiety and aggression by sharply splitting objects into “good” and “bad”; ambivalence is not yet tolerable (Segal, 1964). The self experiences intense anxiety about being destroyed by the “bad” object.
As the infant moves toward the depressive position, aggression projected onto objects gradually turns inward toward the self. With this transition, feelings of guilt become more prominent. The infant begins to recognize that aggression is not solely a threat originating from the object but also a product of its own internal drives (Klein, 1957). This realization gives rise to anxiety about “object loss,” linked to the fantasy of having damaged the loved object.
This process lays the foundation for the development of the capacity for reparation and simultaneously enables a transition toward more integrated object relations in which ambivalence can be tolerated (Segal, 1964).
Returning to the initial question, a similar pattern can be observed across a broad spectrum, ranging from nation-states separated by imaginary borders to small group formations within shared spaces. Through various stigmas and labels, individuals position certain people or groups as “others” in order to preserve their own identity configurations. The devaluation of the other through social comparison serves to strengthen self-worth at both the individual and group levels (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Devaluing the other allows the self to be protected through the externalization of inadequacies, vulnerabilities, and aggression that are difficult to tolerate internally. The existence of the “good” gains meaning through the positioning of the “bad” outside the self; this opposition functions as a defensive organization that reduces the anxiety generated by complexity (Kernberg, 1984).
Just as Klein’s theory suggests, while splitting serves a protective function for the self in early development, this defense is expected to dissolve as psychological development progresses. As the self becomes enriched, the individual learns that there are no absolute boundaries between good and bad, and that the same object can possess both lovable and disappointing aspects. This capacity for integration makes it possible to perceive the world in a more realistic way that includes gray areas, rather than relying solely on black-and-white oppositions. Such development constitutes the foundation of both individual psychological maturity and more inclusive social relationships.
References
Humphreys, G. W., & Forde, E. M. (2001). Hierarchies, similarity, and interactivity in object recognition: “Category-specific” neuropsychological deficits. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(3), 453–476.
Kernberg, O. (1984). Severe Personality Disorders (Psychotherapeutic Strategies). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99–110.
Klein, M. (1957). Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963. London: Hogarth Press.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Segal, H. (1964). Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Volkan, V. D. (1997). Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.